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Abstract
Christian teachers are often encouraged to use
Jesus’ teaching strategies as models for their own
pedagogy. Jesus frequently utilized analogical
comparisons, or parables, to help his learners
understand elements of his Gospel message.
Although teachers can use analogical models to
facilitate comprehension, such models also can sow
the seeds of confusion and misconception. Recent
advances in cognitive psychology have provided
new theoretical frameworks to help us understand
how instructional analogies function in the
teaching-learning process. The goal of this paper is
to analyze Jesus’ analogical teaching from these
psychological perspectives, with implications for all
teachers who utilize instructional analogies. In
addition to reviewing basic analogical learning
processes, I explore a six-variable model to account
systematically for potential analogical
misconceptions.
Introduction
With many similar parables Jesus spoke the word to
them, as much as they could understand. He did not
say anything to them without using a parable. Mark
4:33-34
Interdomain instructional analogies are powerful
tools for teaching and learning. An interdomain
instructional analogy juxtaposes two knowledge
domains that bear little or no surface similarity but
share a common relational structure. Numerous
research studies have demonstrated the instructional
effectiveness of interdomain analogies in promoting
learning, understanding, and conceptual change
(Dagher, 1995; Mayer, 1989; Zook, 1991).
However, teaching and learning by analogy is not
without its risks, for research findings also clearly
indicate that analogies place increased cognitive
processing demands on learners and can encourage
them to form misconceptions and faulty mental
models when they transfer (or map) the wrong ideas
from one domain to another—that is, when they

attempt to extend the analogy too far (Brown &
Clement, 1989; Gentner & Gentner, 1983; Zook,
1993; Zook & Di Vesta, 1991; Zook & Maier,
1994). Ironically, an interdomain instructional
analogy can at once facilitate meaningful learning
and promote confusion and misunderstanding. By
all accounts, analogies appear to function as doubleedged instructional swords.
This double-edged instructional sword is the very
strategy that Jesus employed repeatedly to reveal
principles of the Gospel to people of his time and
future generations. Jesus taught in parables, and
parables are fundamentally instructional analogies.
Although Biblical scholars have readily
acknowledged the teaching function of Jesus’
parables (Hultgren, 2000; Zuck, 1995), their
analyses have routinely ignored this instructional
perspective—most likely due to the lack of an
adequate psychological framework to account for
internal analogical learning processes. The goal of
this paper is to demonstrate how emerging
psychological perspectives on analogical learning
processes should inform our understanding of the
Gospel message that Jesus taught by parable and
influence our use of instructional analogies as
teaching strategies.
Thinking and Learning by Analogy
The fundamental feature of analogical thinking and,
therefore, learning by parable, is relational
comparison. Analogical similarity is ” . . . a special
kind of similarity which is the similarity of
structure, the similarity of form, a similarity of
constellation between two sets of structures, two
sets of particulars, that are manifestly different but
have structural parallels” (Oppenheimer, 1956, p.
129). When people think by analogy, they assert
that two situations are similar because their
underlying relationships are similar—not because
their surface features are similar (Holyoak, Gentner,
& Kokinov, 2001).
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The word “parable” is derived from the Greek word
“parabole” (Hultgren, 2000; Zuck, 1995). This word
is comprised of two roots, “para,” which means
“beside or alongside,” and “ballein,” which means
“to throw.” Thus the Greek word “parabole”
literally means “to throw beside or alongside”
(Zuck, 1995), and the word “parable” refers to
placing two ideas alongside each other for the
purpose of comparison. The comparison usually is
made between a familiar object or event and a less
familiar idea, truth, or principle. Despite differences
in scholarly definitions and classification categories,
all parables possess the fundamental feature of
analogy: nonliteral relational comparison (Sider,
1995).
Proportional and Interdomain Analogies
Proportional analogies take the generalized form of
A:B::C:D (A is to B as C is to D), where A, B, C,
and D are specific numerals, words, or objects. The
basis for the comparison is the equivalent
relationship that holds between AB and CD (A:B =
C:D). As illustrated in Figure 1, to understand a
proportional analogy, the thinker must induce the
relationship between A and B and then transfer, or
map, that relationship to C and D (Pellegrino, 1985;
Sternberg, 1977; Sternberg & Nigro, 1980).
According to Sider (1995), all of Jesus’ parables
can be reduced to proportional analogies. For
example, in the Parable of the Thief (Luke 12:3940) Jesus places the relationship between the owner
of a house and the coming of a thief equal to that of
his disciples and his coming (house owner : coming

of thief = disciples : coming of the Son of man).
Jesus uses a familiar domain of thieves breaking
into houses to promote understanding of a less
familiar domain, the coming of the Son of man. In

both domains, the underlying point, or common
relation, is readiness for the unexpected (Sider,
1995).
Cognitive psychologists usually refer to the familiar
domain as the “base” and the less familiar domain
as the “target.” Thus, to understand Jesus’ meaning
in the Parable of the Thief, the listener or reader
needs to induce the base domain relation (the house
owner should be ready for the unexpected breaking
in of a thief) and map that relation to the target
domain (the disciples should be ready for the
unexpected coming of the Son of man).
Although Jesus’ parables can be reduced to
proportional analogies, they are presented in the
Gospels in more complex form as interdomain
instructional analogies. Whereas proportional
analogies are based on a single common relation,
interdomain analogies represent comparisons
between different knowledge domains on the basis
of a set of common relations (Holland, Holyoak,
Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986). Interdomain analogies
present to learners a greater number of objects and
possible relations to map. The primary difficulty
learners experience when processing an interdomain
instructional analogy is deciding which aspects of
the base domain to map to the target domain (Zook,
1991). This is a nontrivial decision because the
resulting understanding, or conceptualization, of the
target domain can be enhanced or impeded
depending on the specific information selected for
mapping.
Many of Jesus’ parables would be appropriately
classified as interdomain instructional analogies.
Consider, for example, the Parable of the Prodigal
Son. Jesus does not present a simple analogy in
proportional form: prodigal son:father::sinner who
repents:God. Instead, he places the primary objects
of the base domain (son, father) in an embellished
context of additional objects (e.g., the son’s
employer, pigs, an envious older brother, a fattened
calf, a robe, a ring, the father’s servants). Although
the embellishment adds interest and a rich narrative
context, it also introduces a host of object features
and relations that could be potentially mapped from
base to target. For example, when the prodigal son
repents, his father gives him concrete gifts (robe,
ring). When sinners repent, does God bring concrete
rewards such as money and material goods into
their lives? The answer to that question depends
upon whether or not “the giving of material gifts” is
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a base domain relation that is appropriate to map to
the target domain.
Structure-Mapping Theory
What, then, are the mechanisms that determine if a
relation induced in an analogy’s base domain is,
indeed, mappable to the target domain? According
to Gentner’s (1980, 1983, 1986) structure-mapping
theory, interdomain analogies present three types of
potential mappings (see Figure 2): object attributes,
first-order relations, and higher-order systems of
relations. Object attributes are the literal surface
features of specific objects found in the base
domain. First-order relations are relationships

between objects. Higher-order systems of relations
are sets of first-order relations that are held
together, or constrained, by superordinate relations.
According to structure-mapping theory, learners are
most likely to map higher-order systems of relations
rather than isolated (i.e., nonsystem) first-order
relations or surface object attributes. Gentner refers
to this human tendency as the “systematicity
principle.” As a relational system is mapped,
isolated first-order base relations that are not
constrained by the same superordinate relation are
left behind, and literal object attributes are
disregarded.
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Structure-Mapping and Analogical
Misconception
Gentner’s structure-mapping theory provides a
useful framework for understanding how learners
(or the hearers of a parable) might transfer their
knowledge of a familiar base domain to their
emerging conceptualization of an unfamiliar target
domain. However, the theory also suggests several
sources of misconception (Zook, 1991). Although
the theory asserts that learners tend to disregard
surface object attributes and nonsystem relations,
some learners may, in fact, select those
inappropriate features for mapping—particularly
when they are completely unfamiliar with the target
domain. Furthermore, complex base domains may
actually suggest more than one system of relations,
presenting the possibility that learners could map
the relational system intended by the analogy as
well as an alternative system that does not
contribute to the analogy’s instructional purpose.
When such features are mapped by learners, they
encourage the construction of target domain
misconceptions. Even when instructional analogies
do not mention or emphasize base domain object
attributes or nonsystem relations, learners may still
draw from their own personal schemas, or prior
knowledge, and select this information for mapping.
Ironically, when analogies (or parables) are used for
teaching, they open windows for understanding
while simultaneously sowing the seeds of
misunderstanding. The potential for analogical
misconceptions has been documented by a number
of research studies (e.g., Duit, Roth, Komorek, &
Wilbers, 2001; Mason, 1994; Zook & Di Vesta,
1991). Findings from these studies suggest that
when learners are confronted by a completely
unfamiliar target domain, they may inappropriately
map base features simply because they have no
alternative source of information and must rely
solely on the model provided by the base domain.
The analogical model is stored in memory and
becomes available for constructing inferences when
the opportunity or need arises—that is, when the
learner tries to use it to generate an inference
(Anderson & Thompson, 1989; Donnelly &
McDaniel, 1993; Mayer, 1989; Zook, 1993; Zook &
Di Vesta, 1991; Zook & Maier, 1994) or solve a
new problem (Gentner & Gentner, 1983). Thus,
analogically based misconceptions can, in a sense,
lie “dormant” until a precipitating problem or
situation stimulates recall of the base domain and

the learner attempts to “run” the mental model that
it provides (Mayer, 1989; Newby, Ertmer, &
Stepich, 1995).
Structure-Mapping Theory and the Parable of
the Prodigal Son
If parables are, indeed, best considered interdomain
instructional analogies, then readers should be able
to analyze their potential effects on understanding
and misconception by applying the assumptions of
structure-mapping theory. For the purpose of the
present preliminary analysis, I will apply structuremapping theory to the Parable of the Prodigal Son.
The story is recorded in Luke 15:11-31 as the last
parable in a set of three: the Lost Sheep, the Lost
Coin, and the Lost Son. All three analogies are used
by Jesus to illustrate a single common principle,
which he states explicitly after each of the first two
parables: “. . . there will be more rejoicing in
heaven over one sinner who repents than over
ninety-nine righteous persons who do not need to
repent” (Luke 15:7) and “. . . there is rejoicing in
the presence of the angels of God over one sinner
who repents” (Luke 15:10). Jesus offers these
particular analogies in response to a criticism levied
at him by the Pharisees: “This man welcomes
sinners and eats with them” (Luke 15:2). Thus, the
central theme of all three parables should be clear
from the context and Jesus’ explicit statements: God
delights in people who recognize their sinfulness
and come to him in repentance more than those who
consider themselves righteous. With respect to
structure-mapping theory, the parable suggests the
following object correspondences:
base domain target domain
father =

God

son =

repentant sinner

brother =

the self-righteous

The relational system that Jesus intends to be
mapped is comprised of several first-order relations
that are constrained by the superordinate concepts
of unconditional love (the father toward the son)
and envy (the brother toward the son). Each of the
six relations identified below is consistent with—
and supports—the central theme that Jesus states.
Notice how each of the base domain relations can
be expressed in the target domain simply by
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replacing the relevant base objects (in bold) with
their corresponding target objects.
base domain

target domain

son leaves
his father’s care and
expectations

sinner leaves God’s car
e and expectations

son returns to father in
repentance

sinner returns
to God in repentance

father grants
forgiveness to son

God grants forgiveness
to repentant sinner

father celebrates son’s r God celebrates repenta
eturn
nt sinner’s return
brother obeys and
works for father

self-righteous obey and
work for God

brother resents father’s selfacceptance of son
righteous resent God’s
acceptance of repentant
sinner
As the relational system described above is mapped
to the target, surface features of base domain
objects should be ignored. In Jesus’ telling of the
story, for example, several attributes of the father
are noted. He is wealthy, holds property, and
employs men and servants. Although these details
contribute to the narrative, they do not contribute to
the relational system and, therefore, should not be
mapped as characteristics of God.
Finally, the story also suggests additional first-order
relations that are separate (or isolated) from the
mappable relational system. For example, the
envious brother is older than the wayward son.
Although this valid relation is made explicit in the
story, it is not constrained by the relational system
and, therefore, should not be mapped. For example,
it would be inappropriate to infer that self-righteous

folk are always older than repentant sinners because
the envious brother is older than the wayward son.
As our analysis of the Parable of the Prodigal Son
demonstrates, the assumptions of structure-mapping
theory can provide a useful framework for
considering both the learning intended by the story
as well as the misunderstanding that might be
generated from the story by hearers, readers, and
interpreters who would make inappropriate
mapping decisions. However, the theory alone does
not help us predict the circumstances under which
such inappropriate mappings might actually occur.
To investigate this important question, I turn to
Zook and Maier’s (1994) six-variable model of
analogical misconception formation.
Analogical Misconceptions: A Six-Variable
Model
Zook and Maier (1994) developed and tested a sixvariable model to account systematically for the
formation of analogical misconceptions. According
to the model, both learner and instructional
variables interact during the mapping process (see
Figure 3). Learner variables include (a) analogical
reasoning ability, (b) domain-specific knowledge,
and (c) processing goals. Instructional variables
include (a) analogy content, (b) analogy complexity,
and (c) mapping support. In the remainder of this
section, I will examine each of the model’s six
variables and briefly explore their potential
implications for parable interpretation and teaching
by analogy.
Learner Variables: Analogical Reasoning Ability
Analogical reasoning ability is a general variable
that refers to how well learners can execute
component analogical processes such as inducing
relations between base objects and mapping those
relations to corresponding target domain objects
(Sternberg, 1977). From studies with proportional
analogies, researchers know that individuals differ
greatly in their abilities to perform these component
processes and, hence, their abilities to learn from
interdomain instructional analogies, which share
similar processing requirements (Holland et al.,
1986; Pellegrino, 1985).
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Thinking analogically requires the ability to
understand abstract word meanings and induce
relationships between those meanings, a general

cognitive capability often referred to as verbal
aptitude. Verbal aptitude appears to influence
learners’ mapping decisions (Zook, 1993; Zook &
ICCTE Journal 6

Maier, 1994) and their analogical problem-solving
abilities (Corkill & Fager, 1995).
A second variable related to analogical reasoning
ability is learner age. Advances in analogical
reasoning abilities with increasing age are a welldocumented phenomenon. Children tend to
demonstrate difficulties in understanding
proportional analogies and solving problems
analogically prior to adolescence (Bisanz, Bisanz, &
LeFevre, 1984; Gentner & Toupin, 1986; Goldman,
Pellegrino, Parseghian, & Sallis, 1982; Holyoak,
Junn, & Billman, 1984; Sternberg & Rifkin, 1979).
Young children typically base their interpretations
of analogies on the salient surface features of base
domain objects rather than abstract structural
relationships. Eventually, children’s interpretations
of analogies change from this focus on literal
features to a deeper relational comparison. Gentner
(1988) documented this developmental change and
referred to it as the “relational shift.” Zook and
Maier (1994) found that the relational shift has
implications not only for proportional analogies and
analogical problem solving, but also for learning
from interdomain instructional analogies.
Parable interpretation and analogical learning are
susceptible to differences in the verbal aptitudes of
specific interpreters and learners. The interpreters of
parables and other instructional analogies can range
from well-educated scholars who possess,
presumably, high degrees of verbal aptitude to lesseducated individuals who read the parables in the
Gospels and young children who hear parables in
children’s sermons and Sunday school lessons. The
meanings of parables and the subsequent inferences
that are constructed from them by learners who vary
in age and verbal aptitude will also vary
accordingly. Furthermore, the historical and current
temptation to propose allegorical parable
interpretations that focus on literal object
similarities may be a reflection of analogical
reasoning difficulty rather than special theological
insight.
Learner Variables: Domain-Specific Knowledge
The ability to manipulate word meanings is useless
without word meanings to manipulate! Thus,
another important source of variation in the
mapping process is the differential quantity and
quality of domain-specific knowledge that learners
possess. When educators teach by analogy, or
parable, they assume that learners already possess a

meaningful representation of the base domain of the
analogy. Even though the analogy may be a “good”
one in the sense that it suggests a deep relational
comparison, learners will not be able to make use of
it unless their representation of the base domain
includes the critical features to be mapped
(Hardiman, Well, & Pollatsek, 1984). Without preexisting base-domain knowledge, it is impossible
for learners to abstract a relational structure to be
mapped. In the absence of a relational structure, or
schema, learners may direct their attention more
toward salient surface features that they associate
with base objects (Robins & Mayer, 1993).
The domain-specific knowledge variable is
particularly significant for parable interpretation.
Jesus used base domain objects and events that
should have been familiar and readily
understandable to his first-century audience:
mustard seeds, wineskins, sowing seed, forgiving
fathers, and so on. As people move farther away in
time and geographic context from the original
cultural setting in which Jesus taught, these
familiar, well-known objects become less familiar
and—in some cases—completely unknown, making
the induction of a relational schema all but
impossible. Furthermore, some hearers and readers
of Jesus’ parables—both past and present—may
lack a particular understanding of a base object
necessary for understanding the point of the parable,
though the object may be familiar. For example,
consider the Parable of the Prodigal Son. Learners
who do not understand the father’s unconditional
love for his wayward son because they have not
experienced that love from their own fathers may
have difficulty inducing and mapping the relational
schema that Jesus intended.
Learner Variables: Processing Goals
A third variable that affects analogical mapping is
the nature of the learner’s purpose in processing the
analogy. The results of studies by Zook and Di
Vesta (1991), Zook (1993), and Zook and Maier
(1994) all suggest that learners make mapping
decisions based on their perceptions of the purpose
of the analogy. These studies consistently found that
learners were more likely to refrain from mapping
inappropriate base features when the purpose of the
analogy was made clear to them. Understanding the
purpose of the analogy helps to provide the
superordinant system constraint identified in
Gentner’s (1983) structure-mapping theory.
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Jesus often made the instructional purposes of his
parables clear by stating them explicitly. According
to Zuck (1995), Jesus used several strategies to
make his learning goals apparent to his listeners: (a)
beginning the story with a question (e.g., Matthew
11:16; Luke 13:20), (b) beginning a story with a
statement and rhetorical question (e.g., Matthew
24:44-51; Luke 14:28-30), and (c) concluding a
story with a statement of the main point that made
the application clear (e.g., Luke 10:36; Luke 11:5-9;
Luke 16:13). Zuck (1995) notes that Jesus made the
application of his parables explicit fourteen times. A
reader who adopts Jesus’ instructional purpose in
relaying the Parable of the Prodigal Son is less
likely to attend to surface features such as the robe
and ring that the father gives to the son as an
expression of his joy. In contrast, a reader who
approaches the parable for the purpose of justifying
a materialistic lifestyle may be tempted to use those
surface features to make questionable target domain
inferences concerning the rewards that accrue when
people come to God in repentance.
Instructional Variables: Analogy Content
Analogy content refers to the target domain
information to be learned and, more importantly,
the base domain analog that is selected for relational
comparison. In addition to helping learners connect
new information to prior knowledge (Cardinale,
1992-1993; Simons, 1984), analogies also facilitate
the process of knowledge restructuring (Vosniadou
& Brewer, 1987). By forcing learners to consider
the equivalence of two superficially disparate
knowledge domains, they are encouraged to change
their knowledge so it is organized around deeper
relational ideas rather than salient superficial
objects. Such knowledge restructuring is most likely
when the surface features of the base and target are
as different as possible.
Analogies that have readily apparent object
correspondences have “high transparency”—that is,
the learner has little difficulty understanding how
the base and target are similar because the objects,
themselves, are somewhat similar (Gentner &
Toupin, 1986). For example, the Parable of the
Prodigal Son would be considered a hightransparency analogy because fathers and sons share
many of the surface features of God (often thought
of as “heavenly father”) and sinners (often referred
to as “children of God”). Given these obvious
similarities, it is not difficult to perceive the

correspondence between God and the father
described in the parable and sinners and the
parable’s repentant son. In contrast, the Parable of
the Mustard Seed (Matthew 13:31-32) would be
classified as a low-transparency analogy because a
mustard seed shares no surface similarity with the
abstract concept of the kingdom of heaven. A
learner must work much harder to determine the
appropriate object correspondences in a lowtransparency parable such as the Mustard Seed than
a high-transparency parable such as the Prodigal
Son. Difficulties in establishing appropriate object
correspondences in low-transparency analogies may
produce subsequent mapping difficulties and target
domain misconceptions.
Instructional Variables: Analogy Complexity
Analogy complexity refers to the quantity of
features that are available to learners for mapping:
object attributes, mappable relational systems,
alternative relational systems, and nonsystem firstorder relations. The greater the complexity (i.e., the
quantity of base features), the greater the potential
for learners to direct their attention away from the
relevant relational system and, hence, for target
domain misconceptions to occur (Zook, 1993; Zook
& Di Vesta, 1991; Zook & Maier, 1994). Although
the complexity of an analogy is determined
primarily by the base analog that is selected, the
learner’s prior knowledge of the base domain can
provide additional objects, attributes, and relations
as candidates for potential mapping.
The parables of Jesus vary greatly in complexity.
Some parabolic sayings are simple metaphors (e.g.,
“the kingdom of heaven is like yeast,” “you are the
salt of the earth”), and some are more embellished
stories with narrative details (e.g., the Prodigal Son,
the Sower). Even when the base analogs offered by
Jesus are not terribly complex, they have the
potential to grow in complexity in the hands of
creative interpreters or preachers who use their
personal prior knowledge and exegetical
perspectives to suggest additional objects and
relations that may be related only tangentially—if at
all—to the parable’s instructional purpose.
Instructional Variables: Mapping Support
Finally, the degree of mapping support provided in
the instructional setting can influence learners’
mapping decisions. Mapping support can take the
form of direct and explicit cues concerning the
analogy’s purpose, cautions against mapping
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inappropriate features, and identifying for learners
the specific relations to be transferred from base to
target. Certainly, in the Gospel parables, Jesus
demonstrates mapping support frequently—
although not always—by making explicit the
purpose of the parable, stating the principle to be
learned, or explaining the analogy thoroughly (e.g.,
the Parable of the Weeds, Matthew 13:36-43).
Jesus also demonstrates another powerful strategy
for providing mapping support: multiple analogs.
Presenting more than one base forces learners to
induce a relational schema that is common to all the
analogs rather than focusing on the details of a
single analog. Research studies have consistently
demonstrated the value of multiple analogs in
facilitating learning and reducing the incidence of
analogical misconception (Dagher, 1995; Gentner,
Loewenstein, & Thompson, 2003; Spiro, Feltovich,
Coulson, & Anderson, 1989). Interestingly, Jesus
appears to use this strategy naturally at several
points in the Gospels. For example, as already
indicated, the Parable of the Prodigal Son actually
represents the third base analog that Jesus compares
to God’s love for sinners. By deliberately providing
three very different analogs (sheep, coin, son) for
the same target domain principle, Jesus helps his
hearers focus on the critical relational schema to be
mapped rather than the particulars of each
individual analog.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, I have explored a new focus for
inquiry concerning Jesus’ parables by
demonstrating how recent theoretical ideas and
research findings can help to explain and predict
potential difficulties in parable interpretation and
learning by analogy. The facilitative effects of
instructional analogies and, by extension, the
Gospel parables, has been clearly documented.
However, learning by analogy—and by parable—is
fraught with numerous difficulties and dangers.
These dangers appear to be mediated by complex
interactions between both learner and instructional
variables. Given the number and complexity of
variables and interactions that can influence the
mapping process and, hence, analogically
constructed understanding, it is not surprising that
parable study remains a robust field that continues
to attract people with different perspectives and,
therefore, different interpretations. The empirical
and theoretical evidence presented in this paper

suggests that any analogy study is incomplete
unless the interpreter considers learner and
instructional variables that may influence mapping
processes and the resulting meanings that are
constructed.
Jesus’ parables are instructional analogies and,
therefore, can—and should—be analyzed from an
instructional and psychological perspective.
Although such analyses may not radically change
the interpretations that are constructed by different
people who bring their different perspectives (or
learner variables) to the enterprise, they at least may
help readers better understand the reasons why such
varied interpretations may be generated. As I have
demonstrated from psychological evidence,
constructing theological understanding from Jesus’
parables—doing theology by analogy—is risky
business, and it is made all the more dangerous
when readers ignore the cognitive processes that
account for analogical learning.
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